Malta Conference
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Transcripts from the 2-3 December 1989 Malta Conference held between the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War and ideas for the new world order were discussed.
Contents |
First day conference excerpts
December 2, 1989
George Bush: ... Since the idea of this summit was proposed many important events have been taking place in the international arena. I assume that during the forthcoming exchange we will be able to share our views of these changes, not only in Eastern Europe, but also in other regions, in order to improve our mutual understanding of where we stand. I am in favor of not only an exchange in the presence of our delegations, but only on eye-to-eye basis. I believe we should meet more often.
Mikhail Gorbachev: I agree. I have a feeling that we have already talked, and this meeting is the continuation of our useful conversations.
George Bush: Precisely. ... Concerning our attitude toward perestroika. I would like to say as clearly as possible that I agree completely with what you said in New York: The world would be better if perestroika succeeds. Not long ago there was considerable doubt about this in the United States. Back in New York [in December 1988] you said there were elements that did not wish for the success of perestroika. I cannot say that there are no such elements in the United States. But I can definitively say that serious, thinking people in the United States do not share such opinions. These shifts in public mood in the United States are affected by the changes in Eastern Europe, the whole process of perestroika. ... I would like now to lay out a number of positive initiatives that, in our opinion, could in general outline directions for our joint work to prepare an official summit in the United States. [...]
[Bush also touched on regional issues, including the position of the United States with regard to the situation in Central America. Then he proposed to discuss the issues of disarmament.]
George Bush: We would like to inquire if it is possible for the Soviet Union to publish roughly the same amount of data on the Soviet military budget as we do in the United States. I believe that our publications give a rather comprehensive impression about what kind of military activities are undertaken in our country. I am sure that your intelligence services can confirm this authoritatively.
Mikhail Gorbachev: They report to me, on the contrary, that you do not publish everything.
George Bush: I am convinced that the publication of more detailed data on military budgets, on a mutual basis, would encourage trust in this sphere. [...]
Mikhail Gorbachev: ... I would like to share with you some of my thoughts of a philosophical nature. I believe it is important for us both to discuss which lessons should be drawn from past experience, from the Cold War. ...
Not everything that has taken place should be considered in a negative light. For 45 years we have been managing to avoid a big war. This single fact alone says that not everything was bad in the past. Nevertheless, one conclusion is obvious -- the reliance on force, on military superiority and the arms race that stemmed from it, did not withstand the test. And our two countries seem to realize it better than anyone else. To no avail was the ideological confrontation which kept us busy maligning each other. We reached a dangerous brink. And it is good that we managed to stop. It is good that mutual trust emerged between our two countries. ...
Cold War methods, methods of confrontation suffered a strategic defeat. We have come to this realization. And common people have realized this, perhaps even better. I do not want to preach here. People simply interfere into policy making. Ecological problems, problems of preservation of natural resources, problems with regard to bad consequences of technological progress. And all this is understandable, essentially this is a question of survival. And this kind of public mood is strongly affecting us, politicians.
Therefore, we together -- the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. -- can do a lot on this stage to change radically our old approaches. We had already felt it in our contacts with the Reagan administration. And this process continues today. Look how we opened ourselves to each other. ...
But in both countries there are people -- and quite a few of them -- who simply scare us. ... Why do I mention this? From American political circles one hears a thesis: the Soviet Union has begun its perestroika, has been changing its line under the pressure of the Cold War policy [of the United States]. They say that everything is crumbling in Eastern Europe and that this proves that those who had relied on Cold War methods were right. And if so, nothing should be changed in this policy. One should increase pressure and prepare more baskets to collect fruits. Mr. President, this is a dangerous illusion. [...]
You considered the question: what kind of Soviet Union is in the U.S. interest -- the dynamic, stable, solid one or the one struggling with all kinds of problems. I am informed about the advice you have been receiving. ...
George Bush: I hope you noticed that while the changes in Eastern Europe have been going on, the United States has not engaged in condescending declarations aimed at damaging the Soviet Union. There are people in the United States who accuse me of being too cautious. It is true I am a prudent man, but I am not a coward, and my administration will seek to avoid doing anything that would damage your position in the world. But I was insistently advised to do something of that sort -- to climb the Berlin Wall and to make broad declarations. My administration, however, is avoiding these steps, we are in favor of reserved behavior.
Mikhail Gorbachev: I welcome your words. I regard them as a manifestation of political will. It is important for me. ...
Now on Central America. ... I want to emphasize again: we pursue no goals in Central America. We do not want to gain bridgeheads, strong-points, you should be certain of this.
Second day conference excerpts
December 3, 1989
Mikhail Gorbachev: I reaffirmed our principle position regarding the U.S. role in Europe on purpose. There are too many speculations on this issue. They are fed to you, and to us. We should be absolutely clear on such important matters. Now about the changes in Europe. They really are of fundamental character. And not only in Eastern Europe -- in Western Europe too. I received the representatives of the Trilateral Commission. After one of our conversations, Giscard d'Estaing, who was the speaker, addressed me, and said in a very meaningful way: "Be ready to deal with a united federal state of Western Europe." By saying that, I think, he meant that when the European integration reaches the qualitatively new level in 1992, that would be accompanied by a deep restructuring of the political structures, which would also reach a stage of federation.
Therefore, all Europe is on the move, and it is moving in the direction of something new. We also consider ourselves Europeans, as we associate the idea of the common European home with this movement. I would like to ask E.A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Baker to discuss the idea in depth, because, I think, it is in the interests of both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. We should act -- and interact -- in a more responsible and balanced way in this period when entire Europe is undergoing such dynamic changes.
George Bush: I agree with you. [...]
That is what I was telling Primakov. He said that he came to learn from the U.S. Congress. And I said to him: "Leave that idea alone." If you want to build a new system that really works, do not look at our relations with Congress as a model. In general the system is not bad, but sometimes, I am close to desperation.
Mikhail Gorbachev: That is right. Foreign experience should be studied, but we should only adopt something from it if it fits our context. [...]
There are two realities in Afghanistan -- the opposition and Najibullah. Let us help them interact. And what they agree on -- is their business. The Soviet Union will accept any decision. Najibullah is ready for such an open dialogue, and we should not issue ultimatums, or demand his departure. Who will take him out? Do you want us to introduce our troops there again?
James Baker: Stop your massive assistance to Kabul.
Mikhail Gorbachev: Let us stop these empty conversations. Stop thinking that you know everything. You predicted Najibullah's collapse after the withdrawal of Soviet troops many times. They have such a complex situation there that no simple solution will do.
George Bush: To tell the truth, I am surprised to hear that the tribal leaders are already for talks with Najibullah.
Mikhail Gorbachev: Not just ready, they are already talking to him one by one. You can ask Hekmatyar, for example.
George Bush: We are not in contact with him.
Eduard Shevardnadze: But the CIA is.
Brent Scowcroft: We are not trying to prevent the Mujahadeen from contacts with Najibullah.
Mikhail Gorbachev: We also probably know only about a small part of these contacts. The East is the East.
George Bush: I completely agree with you.
Mikhail Gorbachev: Let our ministers continue this useful conversation.
James Baker: We need the Mujahedeen's agreement to the idea of a "transition period." Before, the opposition did not want any contacts with Najibullah. Now they are sending us signals that they are ready to begin talks about a transition period with Najibullah at the table. But that is on one condition -- that there would be an understanding from the very beginning, that at the end of the transition period Najibullah would step down, and a new government would be formed. Here, a United Nations participation could be helpful, including holding an international conference. These are the precise positions from which the American delegation spoke in Wyoming.
Mikhail Gorbachev: We can discuss your ideas.
James Baker: If the Mujahadeen agree, then the next government could include PDPA elements, but only if we have a clear understanding that there would be no Najibullah or his close supporters in it.
Eduard Shevardnadze: Let them decide it on their own.
Mikhail Gorbachev: The dialogue will clarify this issue. The idea of a transition period in itself is reasonable, because it allows the two realities to interact. If the Afghans themselves decide that Najibullah has to go -- let it be so. It is their business. Nobody imposes this on them.
George Bush: That would be good.
James Baker: But the Mujahadeen will simply not sit at the negotiating table if they do not know that at the end of the transition period there will be a new head of government in Afghanistan.
Mikhail Gorbachev: And who could give them such a guarantee? If they are so confident that their positions are strong, why would they worry?
James Baker: There is a new element that appeared recently. The opposition at last is ready to talk to Najibullah about the conditions of forming the new government. But they have to be sure that in the end Najibullah would step down in the interest of peace. [...]
First press conference transcript
3 December 1989
Status of the Cold War
Q. President Gorbachev, President Bush called on you to end the cold war once and for all. Do you think that has been done now?
A. In the first place, I assured the President of the United States that the Soviet Union would never start a hot war against the United States of America. And we would like our relations to develop in such a way that they would open greater possibilities for cooperation. Naturally, the President and I had a wide discussion, where we sought the answer to the question of where we stand now. We stated, both of us, that the world leaves one epoch of cold war, and enters another epoch. This is just the beginning. We are just at the very beginning of our road, long road to a long-lasting, peaceful period.
Thus we were unanimous in concluding about the special responsibility of such countries as the United States and the Soviet Union. Naturally, we had a rather long discussion, but this is not for the press conference - that is, we shouldn't explain our discussion - regarding the fact that the new year calls for a new approach. And thus, many things that were characteristic of the cold war should be abandoned, also the stake on force, the arms race, mistrust, psychological and ideological struggle, and all that. All that should be things of the past.
Central America and Cuba
Q. President Gorbachev, what are the hot spots - what are the hot spots, President Gorbachev, that you spoke about? Is El Salvador? Were you able to assure President Bush that the Soviet Union would use its influence on either Cuba or Nicaragua to stop the arms shipments? And President Bush, were you satisfied with President Gorbachev's response?
A. This question is addressed to me? This subject has been thoroughly discussed. We have reaffirmed once again to the President that we have ceased arms shipment to Central America. We also reaffirmed our position that we are sympathetic with the political process that is going on there regarding the settlement of the situation. We are in favor of free elections, with the representatives of the United Nations and other Latin American countries, to determine the fate of Nicaragua.
We understand the concerns of the United States. We listened carefully to the arguments by President Bush in this respect and we assured him that our position of principle is that we are in favor of a political settlement of the situation in Central America. I believe - and now I wouldn't like to explain everything that we discussed on the subject, but to sum up, I would say that there are possibilities to have peace in that area, tranquility in the interest above all of the peoples of that region, which does not run counter to the interest of the people of the United States.
Managua and San Salvador
Q. No mike. No mike. Question to President Bush from the Izvestia newspaper.
A. I think I owe him a short answer, then we'll come over there. Please ask the question.
Q. The question was, were you, Mr. President, satisfied with - (inaudible).
A. My answer is that we had a in-depth discussion on these questions, just as President Gorbachev said. I will not be satisfied until total self-determination takes place through verifiably free elections in Nicaragua. And the Chairman gave me every opportunity to express in detail the concerns I feel about that region. He indeed has cited his concern, so I can't say there are no differences between us. But we had a chance to talk about them. And if there are remaining differences, I like to think they have been narrowed.
But you know, all of you from the United States, the concerns we feel that the Nicaraguans go through with certifiably free elections, and that they not export revolution into El Salvador. So we had a big, wide-ranging discussion and I would simply say that I feel we have much more understanding between the parties as a result of that discussion.
Economic Cooperation
Q. How about on the Middle East? On Lebanon's Prime Minister?
Q. Question from the Izvestia newspaper to President Bush. And if there are comments from Comrade Gorbachev, we would welcome it. There has been a longstanding issue of expanding economic cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is a very acute problem, taking into account our economic reforms and our economic difficulties. To what degree has that issue been discussed during your meeting, and what is the position of your Administration, Mr. President, regarding the expanding of your economic cooperation, and whether U.S. business would like to promote contracts with the Soviet Union?
A. We had a long discussion about the - on economic matters. We took some specific -made some specific representations about how we can work close - more closely on the economic front with the Soviet Union, and we are - we've made certain representations that we - that I will now follow through with in terms of observer status. And I think one of the most fruitful parts of our discussion related to the economy. And I would like to have a climate in which American businessmen can help in what Chairman Gorbachev is trying to do with reform and obviously with glasnost.
But I think the climate as a result of these talks for investment inside the Soviet Union and for certain things we can do to help the Soviet Union, and indeed other countries, seek common ground with these multilateral organizations related to finance, all of that's a big plus. It was an extraordinarily big plus as far as I'm concerned.
The Momentum from the Talks
Q. President Gorbachev?
A. I would like to comment on the answer. First of all, I confirm what I have said, what the President said. And the second point, things that have taken place at the meeting could be regarded as a political impetus which we were lacking for our economic cooperation to gain momentum and to acquire forms and methods which would be adequate to our contemporary life. Well, as to the future course of this process, this will depend on the Soviet actions, whether legal or economic. You understand that today we try to turn drastically our economy toward cooperation with other countries, so that it would be part and parcel of the world economic system.
Therefore, we think and hope that that has happened during the meeting on this subject of the agenda - well, let's call it the agenda - these have a principal importance.
Stance on Lebanon
Q. How did you discuss that particular option in Lebanon? And what happened, President Bush and President Gorbachev?
GORBACHEV: We couldn't but address this Lebanese conflict because both the U.S. and the Soviet people are sympathetic with the grave situation and sufferings of that people. We explained our views, we shared our views on assistance in this respect, and agreed to continue the exchange of views so that each according to its possibilities. And I think that everyone has its own possibilities. Well, President Bush thought that we had more possibilities and I thought that we had equal possibilities in order to resolve positively this conflict.
Q. May I ask the question to President Bush, please?
A. I remember - (inaudible) - and our aspiration, shared in by President Gorbachev, to see a peaceful resolution of the question regarding Lebanon. We support the tripartite agreement. He has supported it very actively. We do not want to see any more killing in Lebanon. The Chairman agrees with us. We're in total agreement on that. And so Lebanon was discussed in detail and we would like to see a return to a peaceful, democratic Lebanon. And everybody in the United States, I think, shares the agony that I feel about the turmoil in Lebanon, but we're going to try to help. We are trying any way we can to help.
The Course of Foreign Policy
Q. My question is to President Bush. Gennadi Vasilyev, Pravda. You, as President of the United States take - participate for the first time at the summit meeting, but you were the Vice President of the previous Administration and took part in forming foreign policies. So, what is your assessment of the course that our two countries have passed since Geneva to Malta?
A. We call it slow ball in the trade - means it's an easy question - because I really think they are improving dramatically. There is enormous support in our country for what Chairman Gorbachev is doing inside - inside the Soviet Union. There is enormous respect and support for the way he has advocated peaceful change in Europe. And so this meeting accomplished everything that I had hoped it would. It was a no-agenda meeting, and yet it was a meeting where we discussed, as the Chairman said, many, many subjects. So I think, if a meeting can improve relations, I think this one has.
Chemical and Nuclear Weapons
Q. President Gorbachev, did you reach any actual understanding on instructions or timetables or deadlines to negotiators on chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, conventional arms?
A. Well, you know we devoted much time to the discussion of concrete issues that related to disarmament and negotiations on different types of arms. And just as an example to show you that this was a substantive discussion, I'll tell you that in the near future our foreign ministers will meet, which have been instructed to do some specific work to move the oppositions closer.
In connection with the new interesting proposals by President Bush regarding chemical weapons which have the goal of a global ban and provides for certain phases and movement towards this global ban, then we have the possibility of a rapid movement toward it.
As to strategic offensive arms, the analysis of the situation and the instructions that have been given regarding the preparation of that treaty demonstrate that we may be able by the second half of June - and we agreed on the formal meeting at that time to do the necessary work to agree on the basic provisions of this treaty, which then later in the coming months would be ready for a signature. Therefore I highly assess and evaluate what we have done here.
Well, of course there are questions which would require detailed discussion so that there would be no concerns on both sides. As to our concerns, they are - as regards strategic offensive arms and the preparation of the treaty on the 50 percent cuts of such weapons - they concern SLCM's - well, and in general we raised a question with the President that when we have advanced along different directions on the reduction of nuclear arms and conventional forces, when we move toward defensive doctrines - that is we, the Soviet Union - we are interested in having new elements in the military doctrines of the NATO countries. And, therefore, the time has come when we should begin discussing naval forces. We should discuss this problem also.
Thus, I would also like to confirm, and I think that the President would confirm it, that our discussions were very thorough, which encourages. And therefore we can count on success. This was a salute.
Reasons for Optimism
Q. Can I ask you a question --
Q. Mr. President, will you tell us - President Gorbachev, will you tell me why you were so cautious at the beginning of the negotiations? The Soviet side was very optimistic and now you voice certain optimistic elements. What is the reason for it? Maybe that optimism was not justified. This is the Portuguese television to President Gorbachev.
BUSH: Oh, to President Gorbachev. Go ahead.
GORBACHEV: Well, I would say that there were elements of optimism and pessimism here, and I wouldn't dwell into the details. Well, the core of the question is that, if I read you correctly, is that to what degree we can speak of optimism or pessimism regarding the results of this meeting. Or perhaps I didn't understand you correctly. Did I get you right?
Yes - well, you know, on the eve of the meeting, both sides were restrained and had a well-balanced position, a cautious one, I would say again. This did not mean, however, that we were pessimists. That meant that we were highly responsible. Today now that the meeting has taken place and we have summed up the results with - together with the President, I can tell you that I am optimistic about the results and the prospects that are open now. This is dialectics.
Cuts in Naval Forces
Q. May I return to the question of naval forces please, that President Gorbachev raised just a moment ago? Can you respond to your feeling and exactly what you've told President Gorbachev about your disposition toward reducing naval forces, NATO's disposition on that regard, and if in fact the Soviets are prepared to move to a defensive posture, is not it time to consider some cuts in this regard?
BUSH: The answer is that this is not an arms-control meeting in the sense of trying to hammer out details. We still have differences with the Soviet Union. He knows it and I know it, as it relates to naval forces. But the point is we could discuss these things in a very constructive environment and I certainly - the Chairman knows that I could not come here and make deals in arms control, and I'm disinclined to think that that is an area where we will have immediate progress. But we talked about a wide array of these issues, but we have no agreement at all on that particular question of naval arms control. But the point is, he knows that and I know that.
The point is, he had an opportunity to let me know how important it is, and I can - as a part of an alliance - have an opportunity to discuss a wide array of armament questions, disarmament questions, with our allies. So, it's exactly the kind of climate for a meeting that I had envisualized - that I had envisioned, and that he had envisioned. We can sit there and talk about issues of which we've had divisions over the years, try to find ways to narrow them. And we did narrow them in some important areas. And there are still some differences that exist. There's no point covering that over.
Helsinki Talks and the Mideast
Q. Did you discuss the Soviet proposal on Helsinki 2? And joining which - are you prepared to take a joint initiative with Soviet Union about the Middle East crisis?
BUSH: Is that to me?
Q. Yes --
GORBACHEV: With the President, we said that the Helsinki process should be developed, in keeping with the new demands dictated by the times, so as to conceive and build a new Europe on the basis of the changes, which brings the European countries closer together. We confirmed this a common business of all European states which signed the Final Act of Helsinki, and the Vatican.
Incidentally, the question of Europe arises not only in Europe, but with the active and constructive participation of the United States and Canada also. So we said that this process should gain momentum and get a second breath - a second wind. And transformation of the institutions which have arisen on the basis of the Helsinki process at this stage should proceed in such a way that their nature changes in the direction of the demands of the times. As regards the Warsaw Treaty, it shouldn't be so much a military alliance.
We're entitled to expect that there will be changes in the correlation between the European Common Market and the - our economic community and with the active participation in these processes of the United States. Our view is then, in any case, that the time has come in a balanced fashion, step by step, to take action in the light of the demands of the times, not by leaps and bounds or in an irresponsible reckless fashion in order to disrupt stability or reduce security. No, what we must do is to proceed in such a fashion as to improve the atmosphere, the situation, our relations, stability, and consolidate security. This was the dominant key of our discussion and I'm sure the President will confirm that we had a convergence of views on this.
Q. Did you assure President Bush - President Gorbachev, did you assure President Bush that you will not --
Q. Globo TV from Brazil, Mr. Gorbachev. Mr. Gorbachev - a question to Chairman Gorbachev from Globo TV, Brazil --
BUSH: The question - I think I owe this gentleman --
Forces in Mediterranean
Q. Here's a question on the Middle East. This meeting took place in the middle of the Mediterranean . . . At the meeting, did you discuss the problem of reducing the military presence of the sides or the parties in the Mediterranean?
BUSH: To me? Well, first on the reduction we did not have specific figures in mind. The Chairman raised the question of naval arms control and I was not particularly positive in responding on naval arms control. But we agree that we want to move forward and bring to completion the C.F.E., that does affect Italy and other countries in the sense of they're part of our - strong part of our NATO alliance. So we didn't get agreements crossing the t's, dotting the i's, on some of these issues. But that's not what we were trying to do.
May I respond to this gentleman's last half - the question was Soviet and U.S. - please repeat --
Q. Joint initiatives.
A. It doesn't require joint initiatives to solve the Middle East questions, but we have found that the Soviet Union is playing a constructive role in Lebanon and trying throughout the Middle East to give their support for the tripartite agreement, which clearly the U.S. has supported. And so there's common ground there. That may not always have been the case in history. And that may not always have been the way the United States looked at it as to whether - how constructive the role the Soviets might play.
But I can tell you that, after these discussions and after the discussions between Jim Baker and Shevardnadze, there is a constructive role that the Soviets are implementing. And again, I cite the tripartite agreement. I'm sure that they share our view after these talks in terms of peaceful resolution to these questions in the Middle East - be it Lebanon or on the - in West Bank question. So I don't think we're very far apart on this.
Q. President Gorbachev, did you assure President Bush that the Soviet Union will --
A. My views on the Middle East in terms of our discussion at this meeting, you mean? I can only add to what was said by President Bush that we did discuss this thoroughly, in fact just only very recently, very thoroughly. And it seems to me we do have an understanding between us that we must do our very best, independently and together, to promote a solution to this problem, a very long-standing conflict which is having a very adverse effect on the whole world situation.
We agreed that now the results of what the sides have done - we've reached a point, there's a real chance of taking a decisive step to open a process of a settlement. And what it's important to do is not to miss the opportunity to do that, because the situation changes very swiftly. And we think that we will make our contribution to that.
Status of Brezhnev Doctrine
Q. Did you assure President Bush that the changes in Eastern Europe are irreversible, that the Soviet Union has foresaken the right to intervene there militarily? And President Bush, similarly, as a result of this meeting, are you now more trusting that the Soviets have, indeed, renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine?
Q. A most important question from Czechoslovakia for Mr. Gorbachev. Will Soviets renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine which enabled the Soviets to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968?
A. I don't want to be understood as being authorized to speak on behalf of all Eastern European countries. This would not be in keeping with the facts. We are part of Eastern Europe certainly. We are part of Europe as a whole, too. And we work together with our allies in all areas. We have profound ties, but each country is an independent power, an independent factor in world politics. And each people has the right to decide, and does decide the fate of its own state.
All I can say is my view. And I think that these changes in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, as an objective fact, have been caused by the actual historic process itself, and no one can avoid that. It's a problem whose time has come. We have to solve it by new means, using our experience and the potential which these states have accumulated, and also opening up opportunities for the use of everything that's been a positive accumulated in human experience.
And I think the orientation of these processes is something that we should welcome because it's connected with the desire of these peoples to ennoble their societies, to make them more democratic, humanitarian, to open up to the rest of the world. So I'm encouraged and inspired by all these processes, and I'm sure this is the way they are understood and appreciated by other peoples.
Of course, I also see that there are processes going on, profound processes of change in Western countries, too, including Western European countries. And this is very important, too. There's a kind of a movement bringing states, countries, and continents together. But nevertheless, there are processes where each individual country prefers its commitments, its choices, and its individualities. That's very important, and it's important for all of us to understand that.
Q. I'm speaking on behalf of a group of Czechoslovak --
BUSH: And as President Gorbachev talks about democratic change, and peaceful, that certainly lays to rest previous doctrines that may have had a different approach. And so we are - he knows, and not just the President, but all the people in the United States would like to see this peaceful, democratic evolution continue. And so I think that's the best way to answer the question, because the change is so dramatic and so obvious to people. But I will say we had a very good chance to discuss it in considerably more detail than I think would be appropriate to discuss it here.
Dispute on El Salvador
Q. President Bush, you have accused the Soviet Union for sending arms to El Salvador, to Central America, and President Gorbachev, you have denied those charges. Now both of you are sitting here together, who is right?
A. Maybe I ought to take the first shot at that one. I don't think we accused the Soviet Union of that. What we did say is arms were going in there in an unsatisfactory way. My view is that not only did the Nicaraguans acquiesce in it, but they encouraged in it - encouraged that to happen. And the evidence is demonstrable.
But I'm not challenging whether - the word of the Foreign Minister. He and Jim Baker talked about that, and President Gorbachev and I talked about it. All I know is that - and he said it earlier, elections - free elections is - should be the mode. And I also reported to him what Mr. Oscar Arias called me about, blaming Castro and the Sandinistas for exporting revolution and for just tearing things up there in Central America. So we may have a difference on that one, but I want to be careful when you say I accused them of sending these weapons. I did not, because Mr. Shevardnadze made a direct representation to Mr. Baker. And everyone knows that there's a wide international arms flow out there, but whatever it is, however it comes, it is unsatisfactory for countries in the region that want to see the evolution toward democracy continue.
GORBACHEV: The President has quite rightly reported our discussion on this. There was no accusation made against us and we didn't have to accept or reject such an accusation, therefore. We told the President that we have assurances - firm assurances from Nicaragua that no deliveries using certain aircraft actually were carried out. President Bush didn't agree with that and we heard that also. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the principle, I said, and President Bush confirmed this, that we're in favor of free elections. We want to see this conflict ended by political means, and we want to see a normalization of the situation there.
BUSH: That's what we agreed on. I agreed - I agree that that's where the --
Q. What about the accusations of Oscar Arias on Cuba?
BUSH: That, that's the assessment. I still feel that arms are going into El Salvador. We've seen clear evidence of it, and - but I can't argue with the factual presentation made here. But we have a difference. I don't believe that the Sandinistas have told the truth to our Soviet friends. And why? Because we know for a fact certain that arms have gone in there. I'm not saying they're Soviet arms. They've said they aren't shipping arms and I'm accepting that. But they're going in there and I am saying that they have misled Mr. Shevardnadze when they gave a specific representation that no arms were going from Nicaragua into El Salvador. And that's - so we have some differences in how we look at this key question. And the best way to have those differences ameliorated is to have these certifiably free elections in Nicaragua.
And Castro - I have no influence with him whatsoever. And maybe somebody is yelling that question at President Gorbachev. But look, we've got some differences in different places around the world.
Accusations Against Cuba
Q. President Gorbachev, what about the accusations of President Arias on - about Cuba? Oscar Arias apparently called President Bush and told him that Cuba really created the situation in the region. It was fomenting revolution in --
A. We discussed the situation in Latin America, expressed our views on the basis of our own analysis and our own assessment, said to the President that the conditions are ripe for changing the situation for the better. The different sides do have a wish to do this, to normalize the situation, not only in the region but also in the United States.
Changes in the Germanys
Q. How do you assess the German situation?
A. Do you want to begin on the German question?
BUSH: I'd be glad . . . Somebody better tell me what the question was then, if I'm going to answer. Was it the question of Germany? The United States, part of NATO, has had a longstanding position. Helsinki spells out permanent borders. We - I made clear to President Gorbachev that we, for our part, do not want to do anything that is unrealistic, and causes any country to end up going backwards, or end up having its own people in military conflict, one with the other.
And so, I think we have tried to act with the word that President Gorbachev has used to - and that is, with caution, not to go demonstrating on top of the Berlin wall to show how happy we are about the change. We are happy about the change. And the German question is - I've heard many leaders speak about the German question, and I don't think it is the role of the United States to - to dictate the rapidity of change in any country. It's a matter for the people to determine themselves. So that's our position, and the last word goes to the Chairman on this one.
GORBACHEV: Yes, on that as he ended, the President wrote in English and I don't read English. I answered him in Russian and he doesn't read Russian. But, we agreed.
BUSH: No matter what it said. . . .
GORBACHEV: I have several times expressed my views on this point, and because we discussed it with the President, we considered all these questions on the condition of the Helsinki process. We realize that the real situation in Europe, the current situation in Europe is that in modern Europe there are two German states, Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic.
Well, there are two German states in Europe today, the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. They are members of the United Nations, sovereign states. This is the bidding of history, this is what history has willed. I always have recourse to this argument. So as to remain realistic, we must understand that history does dictate the fate and the processes on the continent, and also determines the role and place of these two states.
And we think that there is an understanding today in the minds of all. And any artificial attempt to do anything to that process -well, we mustn't do anything to belittle the great significance of the great changes which are happening in this continent. It's a central part of contemporary history. It would not be - we don't want to do anything to accelerate these changes artificially for the peoples of these two great German states.
Can we thank the press for its cooperation? Of course, we don't know what they've written yet, and what they will be writing.
BUSH: Reserve the right to thank them afterward, you mean? After they've written?
GORBACHEV: No. I think right now, and they will write better. I'd like to thank you for your cooperation.
BUSH: We do have to leave at 1:20. Should we each take one more question or not? Agreeable? All right, last one - last one for me right here. No rebuttal, no back up question. The last one.
Ties Between the Chiefs
Q. What's your personal relationship now between the two (inaudible) and would regular contacts that would perhaps no longer be called summits be helpful?
BUSH: I had known President Gorbachev before and I'll let him speak for himself, but I think we have a good personal relationship and I believe that helps each side be frank, point out the differences as well as the areas we agree on. And that is a very, very important ingredient, I think, because of the standing of the two powers and because of the dramatic change that is taking place. And I am not saying that if he likes me, he is going to change long-held policies, and I'm going to say if I like him, we're not going to change long-held policies.
But what we've been able to do here is to get together and talk about the differences without rancor and as frankly as possible. And I think it's been very constructive. So I couldn't have asked for a better result out of this non-summit summit. And the question is regular meetings? I'm open for - to see him as much as it requires to keep things moving forward. We've already set a summit meeting. That summit meeting will drive the arms-control agenda. And that's a good thing, because I represented to him that we wanted to see a Start agreement, a C.F.E. agreement, and hopefully a chemical agreement. That's a very ambitious agenda. But I think if we hadn't sat here and talked we might not have understood how each other feels on these important questions.
GORBACHEV: I'd like to confirm what's just been said by President Bush, that we've known each other for quite a long time now. I'd just like to add that perhaps - of course we didn't agree on this with the President, and I don't think I'm disclosing a great secret, that we've already had detailed discussions when we had our previous contacts, and we informed each other of each other's positions basically.
Pleased With the Discussions
At Governors Island or in the automobiles, we've had discussions, and we've had correspondence subsequently. And this meeting we've had here has made our personal contacts, placed them on a different level, and I'm very happy with the meeting we've had, the talks we've had, two talks one-on-one.
Like the President, I do feel that personal contact is a very important factor in relations between political leaders, particularly of such states as the Soviet Union and the United States. And I am committed to the idea of personal contacts. Although, as I said to the - as the President said correctly, this doesn't mean that for the sake of personal contacts, we can back away from our positions or can forget our responsibilities. No, it's just that personal contacts makes it possible for us the better to carry out our responsibilities and work together more effectively and more effective cooperation in the interest of our two peoples and in interests of the whole world community.
On my own behalf I'd like to thank you for this meeting. Thank you, Mr. President, for your cooperation for Soviet-American endeavors.
BUSH: Thank you, sir. Well, I guess we're going to fly away to Brussels.
Second press conference transcript
3 December 1989
A Better Understanding
A. . . . All the problems that have existed over the years between Western Europe and the rest of the NATO allies and Eastern Europe. But I understand better where he's coming from, and that, I think, is very important. And he understands our priorities. He understands the concerns, for example, that I feel about Central America, because we really had a good, frank discussion.
NATO and the Cold War
Q. But if I can follow up on this goal, as I say, you set for yourself, at least toward movings towards an end to the cold war. He said an epic has ended. How do you feel about that?
A. I think this is a major step towards understanding and towards any - in trying to tear down any remaining barriers that shot up because of the cold war. There's no question that the conditions today are far different than at the depths of the cold war. No question about it. I haven't even heard anybody argue to the contrary.
Q. Mr. President, what do you think of NATO and Warsaw Pact evolving to political organizations and really moving out of a military mode?
A. Well, if we make the progress that I hope we'll make on various arms-control items and if tensions continue to go down, as they have, inside the Soviet Union and in terms of relations with the United States and Eastern Europe, who knows where the change will take us. But obviously, I have a certain responsibility for keeping NATO strong, and nothing here has altered that desire. But as you see the historical changes taking place, I think it's fine to envision a group of countries that spend a lot more time worrying about the economic side and less on the defense side. We are not there yet. We are not there.
Q. What are you going to tell --
Q. Mr. President --
Q. The NATO -- what are you going to tell the NATO leaders?
A. This is a follow up.
Q. What will you tell the NATO leaders?
A. Well, I'll wait until I get there to decide that. I'll give them a pretty good report on what went on in considerable detail - not all necessarily, because some relates to the U.S.-Soviet equation. But we'll have a good, frank discussion, and I think they will be pleased at what the results of the meeting are.
Tenor of the Talks
Q. Mr. President, other than the weather, were there any disappointments? You seem to still be at odds, very much so, on Central America. And was there anything Mr. Gorbachev told you that especially surprised or pleased you?
A. No, no surprises. And, I - but as I say, Michael, we cannot in, you know, 10 hours of discussion or whatever it is, solve all the problems that exist between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the way we look at different areas. But, it's - it would be euphorically optimistic to think that a meeting like this would solve all those problems. But it's better, we understand more. I've got some areas where I can now go back to him, various areas. But there were no surprises. It was a wide discussion - I'm not sure we left out any subjects in a geopolitical sense, but we covered a lot of them.
Q. How long --
Q. Disappointments - no specific disappointments? Something you wish he was more forthcoming on?
A. No particular disappointments, no.
Q. Mr. President --
A. Because I think the - I think the goal now is to go forward, as we have wanted to anyway, and demonstrate everybody's commitment to C.F.E. talks, everybody's commitment to chemical-weapons reductions, eventual elimination, and of course, the Start agenda.
Gauging Gorbachev
Q. Do you think that the --
Q. Mr. President, you talked about --
A. I'll be over, Terry.
Q. . . . now having a better understanding of Mr. Gorbachev after this meeting. Could you tell us what you know about him today, or understand about him today --
A. Well, I know that he's perfectly willing to have very frank discussions, even if I'm on the opposite side of a question from him. There was no anger, there was no vitriol. It was a very constructive set of meetings in that regard.
And so, I saw a man who is confident. I saw a man who was calm in our - in his presentations, and responded as factually as he could in some of the questions I raised. And so, I am convinced that the concept of getting together for a no-agenda meeting was very, very sound.
U.S.-Soviet Relations
Q. Do you think that the United States and the Soviet Union now are dealing with each other more as allies than adversaries?
A. I wouldn't say allies, but with far less misunderstanding, and with far more common goals.
Q. What do you think of the adversarial relationship, of the nature of the relationship now?
A. Well, I say - as I say I think it's vastly improved, tensions reduced - not eliminated but reduced. We still have different ways of looking at certain questions, and - but I think the answer is improved. Terry?
Flight 103 and Terrorism
Q. Mr. President, relatives of Pan Am 103 bombing were going to have a ceremony in the harbor today, drop flowers into the harbor as part of their attempt to have both you and Mr. Gorbachev work together in fighting international terrorism. Did this come up -
A. Yes.
Q. Specifically this weekend? Did you talk a little bit about it?
A. Not 103 per se, but you're talking about anti-international terror. Yes, it did, and also in the anti-narcotics efforts. So there's more we can do. We didn't discuss it specifically, but I'm thinking about certain kinds of intelligence interchange that can prove to be beneficial.
Q. What was the conversation he was referring to on Governors Island in the car?
Q. In the car.
A. No, no. The car was in Washington. You remember when we rode from the embassy over to -- (inaudible)
. . . perestroika failed, and that it wasn't going to fail, and it is irreversible. And I told him back then that I didn't think there were any serious elements in the United States that wanted to see perestroika fail. So that's probably what he was alluding to. I missed that part of it.
Soviet Role in Cuba
Q. Secretary Baker, before he came out here a couple weeks ago, said that the Soviet role in Cuba and Central America was the primary obstacle to a more beneficial full-scale relationship between the two countries. You agree - now you disagreed here, but did you advance the issue at all? Can you say -
A. I don't know we advanced it, but I was very, very clear in telling him how strongly I feel about that, and it did build on what Jim Baker had talked to Shevardnadze about out in Wyoming. So there is no doubt in their minds that their assistance to Cuba and their lip service for the Sandinistas give us a considerable amount of difference with them. I mean, so it's very clear - well, until we see a free Cuba, self-determination and the people deciding what they want, Cuba will stick out until that date, as a tiny country, but swimming against Mr. Gorbachev's own tide. And I made that point to him, and --
Q. How did he respond to that?
A. Well, I'll let you ask him first chance you get.
Arms Control
Q. Can I ask you a question on arms control? Did I understand President Gorbachev to say that you hope to have a framework agreement in late June, but not an actual Start Treaty?
A. I think we should shoot for a Start Treaty. I'm advised by some of the pros that that's complicated. But look, I think we ought to go forward and try to get a Start agreement. And I think there - I think most everybody would like to see that happen. I don't see any resistance to it, but we've got some technical problems involved, that - let the experts discuss, not me.
So I don't - if he said that there wouldn't be - I mean, if the implication that you got was there won't be a Start Treaty in the summer of '90, I didn't get that feeling from him. Now --
Q. So that you still think it's entirely possible or --
A. I think it's possible, but we have to drive the system.
Q. Is it likely?
A. I - it's hard to, hard to quantify my feeling on that one. But I don't - I really don't see a reason why it can't happen.
'Star Wars'
Q. What about S.D.I. in that context? Did you talk about S.D.I.?
A. Just a wide array, you can just be sure that defensive was talked about as well as offensive, as rockets as well as people. It was a wide, wide array of discussion on that general - yeah.
Troop Reductions
Q. Was the procedure for troop cuts beyond C.F.E.-1 discussed?.
A. Yes, he is very much interested in seeing troop cuts beyond C.F.E. He knows I'm part of an alliance and not going to go off on some unilateral tack on that. But I think in fairness to the man, he did - he did raise that. But I think we both agree that the immediate goal is to push the system on both sides so we can get a C.F.E. agreement. And back to Terry's question, I think that's entirely possible. It should be, and we're going to - I'm going to be driving our bureaucracy and discussing it at NATO, because I think it's a very important step.
Military Budget Cuts
Q. Well, in that respect are you going to cut the defense budget?
A. Not in that respect.
Q. Well --
A. We've already cut the defense budget.
Q. (inaudible) . . . Cheney certainly has been talking a lot about --
A. Listen, he's doing exactly what I want him to do - go back and question and see how things can be restructured. And if there is a way to prudently save money and not weaken the common defense of NATO or not weaken the defense - the ability of the United States to protect our friends around the world, fine. That would be acceptable to me. But we're simply not going to go out there and make draconian cuts in defense so I can solve this Gramm-Rudman problem.
The Kremlin and War
Q. Well do you believe him when he says he won't start a hot war?
A. I - I think he has no intention of starting a hot war. You mean - where he said - attacking the United States' interests?
Q. Well --
A. What - how did he phrase it? It was something like that.
Q. A hot war against the United States.
A. Yeah, - I have no - I have no evidence that there is anything other than the truth in that statement.
Q. May I ask --
FITZWATER: We're going to have to go. We'll give Frank a final one here --
Q. Just some person thoughts, coming here after all the preparation and some criticism of being --
BUSH: Yeah --
Q. (inaudible) . . . too timid or --
A. Wasn't that interesting - let me interrupt once to editorialize - wasn't it interesting the way he used the word caution, and I didn't put him up to it either. But go ahead.
FITZWATER: He said prudent at one time, too.
BUSH: Go ahead.
Meeting's Personal Side
Q. What was it - what was it like for you, what did it feel like sitting across from this man and in many ways discussing the shape of a world that cannot -- (inaudible)
A. Well inasmuch as I'd met him before and had a couple of private conversations with him before, it was probably less formidable than if I'd never, never met him. And given the changes that he's advocating in terms of, you know, self-determination and an Eastern Europe changing without any threat of force from them, the climate was easier because of those things.
But there still was, you know, a recognition on my part, one, that this was serious business, and two, that we have got to find ways to work for peace constructively. And sitting across the table from me was a person that can have as much to say about that as any other individual in the world, given the superpower defense status of both countries.
So there was a feeling of - there was a recognition that this was important, and yet the climate in the meeting - the climate in the meetings was without rancor and without hostility. I remember a time when I first met Mr. Gorbachev and we talked about human rights and he became visibly agitated with me for raising it.
And I think there's been a great evolution in his thinking on that question, and certainly in his relations with the United States, just as there has been an evolution on my thinking. You may remember I was the one who was against the very kind of meeting that I decided was necessary, because I think as these changes take place, this kind of meeting can be helpful.
So it was - the emotional part of it, Frank, is hard to describe for me because I'm not the most articulate emotionalist. But I just can't have asked for a better ambiance, a better feel from the meetings, even though the differences are acute in some areas.
The Emotional Side
But you get the feeling he really wants to work with us, and he knows that I'm cautious, and you heard him talk and use the word prudent. I'm sure that was deliberate on his part. I do think this, that six months ago, there was probably a misunderstanding on his part about the intentions of this new President.
And I think one of the good things is, I don't think he has any feeling that I'm going to be unforthcoming in situations where I should be. I don't think he has me down as a total negativist at all. And I certainly don't have him down and as I see the reception he gets in Italy, I can talk to him about why that emotional response, his identity with change.
So, back to the personal side, the events helped. His own personality helped. I'd like to think he thought I knew what I was talking about. And so we have a good exchange without having to go to the experts or go to the notebooks and it worked. And now we've got to move - now we've got to move forward and I think we can in a lot of ways. I think we can on the economic front. I'm convinced we can and must on the arms-control front.
Bush's Report to the U.S.
Q. You go before NATO tomorrow. How are you going to report to the American people --
A. I don't know whether we're having a -we may well have a press conference when we get back.
FITZWATER: At an unspecified time.
BUSH: That's the best way to do it.
Q. (inaudible)
A. You mean a speech? Well, I just did one just before going and I don't want to --
Q. (inaudible) . . . press conference is good.
A. (inaudible) . . . abuse the, you know, the hospitality of the air waves. But I think we can get the message out by responding to questions.
Q. Thank you.
On the President's Temper
Q. Did you ever lose your temper?
A. No.
Q. You said that he had no rancor himself.
A. No, I don't lose my temper.
Q. Lies.
A. I don't - I don't --
Q. You get to see you a lot.
A. I keep it all inside. No, no that's where I think your reporting has been a little off. What was that they got on Marlin about saying, he hit the ceiling - what was it - a few months back, which is untrue.
Q. (inaudible)
A. No, but I don't have to. I'm matured. And the answer is, don't worry about things you can't do anything about. That's a little advice I got from the doctor in 1960 and it works. So why blow up at Helen if she asks a question I don't like, or this one over here?
Q. I've seen you go up in smoke --
FITZWATER: This is getting into a difficult area --
A. BUSH: If occasionally I do go up in smoke, it doesn't relate to this line of work. It's other things.
FITZWATER: You'll take this to the filing center, right, so they can make a transcript?
BUSH: We'll see you guys. See you on the plane.